[Draft][CEPR DP][CSEF WP][MoFiR WP][Online Appendix]
Abstract
Presentations: 10th CSEF-IGIER Symposium on Economics and Institutions*, EEA Congress 2025, CEPR-IMO Workshop (Bocconi), CEPR Governance in a Polarized World (POLECONFIN), EBRD Office of the Chief Economist Seminar, CEPR Symposium, Working Group in African Political Economy; 8th EBRD-CEPR Research Symposium: The Frontiers of finance in emerging markets; Groningen internal seminar; SIOE 2026 Conference. (* if by coauthor)
Abstract: How do organizations adapt internally when ethnic divisions intensify? We develop a model with an organization jointly choosing managerial assignment and delegation when locally-matched managers have better information but are less aligned with headquarters, and test it using a panel of Ethiopian bank branches. Exploiting variation in banks' exposure to ethnic conflict through their branch networks, we find that conflict increases the appointment of locally-matched managers, while reducing their lending autonomy and leaving branch credit mostly unaffected. Conflict-exposed branches are more likely to be staffed by experienced insiders reassigned within the bank. An LLM-based CEO vignette exercise corroborates this mechanism.

